This paper focuses on the importance of equity markets in facilitating the exit of entrepreneurs investing in technology. Entrepreneurs'willingness to invest and aggregate output is a¤ected in two opposite ways. First, uncertainty about equity price or lack of market liquidity discourages technology adoption. This can explain slow technology adoption and limited participation by venture capitalists in underdeveloped equity markets. Second, imperfectly informed market participants rationally take fast adoption as a positive signal. The resulting increase of expected market value encourages technology adoption. Fast technology adoption is most probable if the quality of information is at an intermediate level.
Introduction
There is a growing interest in channels through which more developed …nancial markets promote entrepreneurial and innovative activities and thereby long-term growth. 1 The bene…ts of more developed …nancial markets are most often analyzed through their positive impact on availability of external …nancing. This paper takes a di¤erent approach by emphasizing that in addition to providing funding, equity markets have an important role in facilitating ownership transfers from entrepreneurs investing in technology to managers running these …rms once the technology is adopted. Good exit opportunities are also important for venture capitalists who can provide funding for investments in technology. The paper suggests a new mechanism that shows how the development of equity markets can determine the incentives to invest in technology and aggregate output even if credit constraints are not binding. The paper focuses on technology adoption (or innovation) decisions made by risk averse entrepreneurs who sell their …rms in the equity market. The main implications arise from a double-sided information asymmetry. On the one hand, entrepreneurs are likely to have superior information about the fundamental value of their …rms as compared to the average equity market participant. On the other hand, they do not know what information equity market participants will receive in the future.
The main results in this paper arise from two opposite forces a¤ecting entrepreneurs' incentives to invest in the newest and most expensive technologies. First, high uncertainty can discourage investment in the most advanced technologies -the "fear of unstable markets" force. Second, given that entrepreneurs have superior information about the value of their …rms, their decision to invest in the newest technology becomes a positive signal to the market. This increases the expected market value of …rms and encourages entrepreneurs to invest is such technology -the "adoption to signal" force 2 . The quality of information in equity market (the degree of information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors) determines which of these two forces is predominant.
In less developed equity markets, when investors have very imprecise information, entrepreneurs choose to adopt technology slowly and copy older technologies instead of investing in the newest ones. Furthermore, underdeveloped equity markets can explain why foreign agents, who are able to reduce technology adoption costs, may not participate in projects they would …nd pro…table in perfect equity market.
Fast technology adoption (i.e. investment in the newest technology) is most likely, when the quality of information investors have is at an intermediate level. In this case, investments in technology are still informative about the underlying productivity, while the negative effect through uncertainty is not pressing. As a result, entrepreneurs have the highest expected gains from investing. In fact, the gains from fast technology adoption are higher than in perfectly informed equity market. When quality of information is very good, there is no information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and potential buyers and both, the discouraging "fear of unstable markets" and the encouraging "adoption to signal" force disappear. The implied non-monotonic relationship between investments in technology or GDP growth and equity market development is consistent with correlations in transition economies and high and upper-middle-income countries (see Appendix A).
The non-monotonic relationship has implications for policies that aim for greater transparency. For example, policy makers can a aim to develop institutions and laws that facilitate access to information. The paper considers a policy maker who has a full control over the quality information. If such policy maker aims to maximize the probability of fast technology adoption or output and wages of local agents, he would not choose full transparency. Setting the quality of information "too high" would eliminate the gains from "adoption to signal".
In more developed markets, where the "adoption to signal" force is likely to be stronger than the "fear of unstable markets" force, the model predicts "overinvestment" in technology that leads to overpricing of equity and subsequently lower returns for investors. The paper provides a rational explanation for this pattern that is supported by empirical literature discussed in Section 4.
The basic model presented in this paper shows the mechanisms in a setting where the equity market is perfectly liquid (i.e. the number of investors trading in the equity market is very large). It also assumes that all investors are identical and less informed than entrepreneurs, who establish …rms adopting technology. Further extensions show that the predictions of the model are robust to considering less liquid equity markets and the presence of some investors in the equity market, who are as well informed as the entrepreneurs. The lack of liquidity has an additional negative e¤ect on incentives to invest in technology, called the "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect. When there is a limited number of informed investors in the equity market, the average quality of information among equity market participants also depends on the number of informed investors.
The model is also extended to analyze endogenous entry to entrepreneurship. It is shown that the aggregate impact of the main forces is reinforced. In equity markets, where "adoption to signal" force dominates the "fear of unstable markets" force (and "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect), there is more entry to entrepreneurship and faster growth compared to perfect equity market. While, if the negative forces dominate, there is less entry and slower growth.
The setup of the model relies on two crucial assumptions. First, an entrepreneur must sell his …rm before it generates pro…ts. The need to exit would emerge endogenously if some agents have a comparative advantage to be entrepreneurs rather than managers, as in Holmes and Schmitz Jr. (1990) . Moreover, venture capitalists can be seen as agents who are skilled in judging whether it is worth investing in a particular technology. They are generally not constrained in credit markets and prefer to exit fast (Jovanovic and Szentes 2007) . Lack of good exit opportunities is a major concern for these agents when assessing investments in developing countries (Lerner and Pacanins 1997) . Figure 1 shows that venture capitalists perceive the concerns about successful exit to be a larger impediment than the lack of skilled workers or weak intellectual property laws 3 . Among the less developed countries, Asia is often considered as one of the most attractive locations for venture capital (Aylward 1998, Survey The paper relates to the existing theoretical literature on the determinants of the speed of technology adoption. Di¤erences in the speed of adoption could arise from the lack of skilled labor in certain countries that makes the frontier technologies inappropriate for these countries (e.g. Acemoglu 2002) . While that argument is likely to be crucial in countries with 4 According to WDI data for 1996-2004, the median share of the labor force with secondary education in Asia is 28.2% as compared to 33.3% in Latin America, 62.2% in transition countries that entered EU and 56.6% in other transition countries. At the same time, the median stock market capitalisation to GDP in these regions is 44.5%, 24.5%, 13.4% and 10.4%, respectively.
5 There is a large empirical literature on deviations of equity prices from their fundamentals and the impact of market sentiment (see e.g. Cutler, Poterba and Summers 1991 , Lee, Shleifer and Thaler 1991 , Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 , Swaminathan 1991 , Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 1996 . the lowest shares of educated labor force, it is unlikely to explain why there are di¤erences among countries where the share of educated labor force is similar to that of developed countries (e.g. transition countries). In this paper, low productivity of the labor force, would also reduce the probability of fast technology adoption. However, it is shown how the speed of technology adoption can di¤er in countries with a similar labor force, because of the di¤erences in the quality of information.
Obstacles to fast technology adoption can also arise from credit constraints (e.g. Gertler and Rogo¤ 1990 , Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee 2004 , Aghion, Comin and Howitt 2006 . To emphasize the role of the equity market in providing exit opportunities, rather than access to funding, the paper abstracts from credit constraints. Credit constraints of local agents are unlikely to explain, for example, why foreign venture capitalists do not invest more in less developed countries with relatively skilled and inexpensive labor.
Closer to this paper are Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995) and Levine (1991) who show that the lack of liquidity in the equity market reduces the incentives to invest in technology adoption. However, explicit modeling of the equity market in the current paper allows me to isolate the negative e¤ect of lack of liquidity from the non-monotonic e¤ects that arise from imperfect information. As a result, this paper adds new mechanisms. Furthermore, to the extent that development of equity markets is likely to lead to both improvements in liquidity and in the quality of information, an innovative result in this paper is a non-monotonic relationship between equity market development and investments in technology. This is in contrast to the monotonic relationship suggested by the aforementioned papers. This paper is also related to the literature on institutions (e.g. Parente and Prescott 1994), which assumes that weaker institutions increase the cost of technology adoption and imply slower technology adoption. Marimon and Quadrini (2006) model more speci…c frictions such as the interaction between start-up cost and limited contract enforceability that a¤ects the incentives for new entries to the innovation sector. While additional institutional frictions (e.g. property rights, taxation, or other obstacles to establishing or running a …rm) could be incorporated in the model, the two main forces found would still remain important.
Finally, the mechanisms discussed in this paper could apply to investments in general. This paper focuses on incentives for investments in technology for the following reasons. First, investment in technology is a driver of long-term growth (e.g. Romer 1990, Aghion and Howitt 1992) and is therefore likely to have a larger aggregate impact. Second, these investments are likely to require higher entrepreneurial skills and thus potential e¢ ciency gains from ownership transfers are higher. Third, as venture capital has been shown to be a major source of funding for technology …rms (see Kortum and Lerner 2000) , the importance of good exit opportunities is likely to be more important for investments in technology than investment in capital. Consistent with this, Appendix A shows that R&D expenditures are more strongly correlated with equity market development than investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, where all equity market participants are uninformed and the market is liquid. Section 3 presents a number of extensions. It shows the e¤ects arising from lack of liquidity in the equity market, the presence of informed equity market participants and endogenous entry to entrepreneurship. Section 4 discusses empirically testable implications of the model and presents some suggestive evidence from existing empirical literature that is consistent with the model. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The model is a small open economy general equilibrium model with rational expectations. It builds on the endogenous growth literature with quality improvements of technology (e.g. Aghion and Howitt 1992, Aghion et al. 2006 ) and the rational expectations literature (e.g. Grossman 1976 , Allen et al. 2006 ).
The setup

Consumers
The local economy is populated with overlapping generations of rational agents endowed with one unit of raw labor in each period. These agents work and invest in asset markets in the …rst period of their lives and consume only in the second period of their lives. The measure of local rational agents is . There is a measure^ of similar overlapping generations of foreign agents endowed with exogenous wealth W in each period investing in local assets. All agents investing in the asset market are identical and called "investors".
In addition, some rational agents have special skills to be "entrepreneurs" and establish local monopolistic …rms engaging in fast technology adoption.
All agents have mean-variance preferences
where c t+1 is consumption, t is the available information set in t and measures the extent of risk aversion. None of the agents is borrowing or short-sales constrained. The assets traded are local equity and a foreign risk-free bond with a gross return normalized to one available with in…nitely elastic supply 6 . The equity market consists of the shares of j local monopolistic …rms that engage in technology adoption.
Final good production
The production side of the economy consists of a competitive …nal good production sector and an intermediate goods sector that also engages in technology adoption. The price of the …nal good is normalized to one. The …nal good producers use raw local labor, L, and j distinct intermediate goods. Each of these intermediate goods, x t (j), is of quality A t (j) (j 2 [0; 1]). For example, the intermediate good, x t (j), could be a computer designed to perform a particular task in the production line and the vintage of the computer, A t (j), would determine how fast it will perform the task. Final good producers take the price of intermediate goods, p x;t (j), and wages, w t , as given and solve
where the production function has constant returns to scale,
and t measures the productivity of the local labor force in using the technology. This productivity is uncertain before actual production takes place (i.e. uncertainty about t resolves in period t) and can be decomposed into two parts
where t is the explainable part of productivity that is uncorrelated across time and with any other shocks, and u t is a mean zero unexplainable (i.e. pure noise) part of productivity that is uncorrelated with t and also uncorrelated across time and with any other shocks. The explainable part of productivity measures factors such as the quality of labor force, working and management culture, general institutional framework etc. The unexplainable part of productivity captures events that can be due, for example, to natural disasters, sudden disruptions in the production process and the general degree of uncertainty in the economy. The paper studies di¤erent distributional assumptions about these variables that will be speci…ed in Sections 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2.
Intermediate good production
The …nal good producer buys each intermediate good, 
All intermediate goods depreciate fully in one period. Section 2.2 will show how uncertainty about the productivity of the labor force ( t ) translates into uncertainty about the future demand for intermediate goods and the pro…ts of local monopolists. 8 Finally, assume that the frontier technology (A t ) that can be adopted (or invented) grows at an exogenous rate,
and the growth rate of technology is su¢ ciently high
7 Monopolistic power is justi…ed by patent protection or by the fact that that it takes time before copying the newest technologies becomes possible.
8 Di¤erentiated intermediate goods are introduced only to justify the monopolistic power of the intermediate goods sector, which is necessary for entrepreneurs to have incentives to invest in fast technology adoption. As the uncertainty considered is aggregate, Section 2.2 shows that all …rms are identical. Allowing for idiosyncratic uncertainty would complicate the model without eliminating the main mechanisms.
This condition guarantees that …nal goods sector always prefers to buy machines with a frontier technology (A t ) from a monopolist to buying cheaper machines from competitive intermediate goods produces who produce machines with old technology (A t 1 ). 9 2.1.4 Technology adoption and information asymmetry Each period t, an entrepreneur in sector j decides whether to invest in fast technology adoption and establish a local monopolistic …rm that is active in period t + 2.
The basic model assumes that for each intermediate good j, there is only one 10 talented entrepreneur, whose e¤ort is needed for technology adoption and who knows the explainable part of productivity in the …nal goods sector, t+2 . Given that the entrepreneur must retire before his …rm produces pro…ts, he sells his …rm in the equity market. This assumption captures the need for exit and ownership transfers. Each …rm has one divisible share. In addition to entrepreneur's e¤ort, fast technology adoption requires paying a …xed cost in …nal goods. The …xed cost of establishing a fast adopting …rm is
The cost of fast technology adoption is assumed to be proportional to the quality of technology in the period in which the …rm will be active and measures how expensive fast technology adoption is. If there is any cost for entrepreneurs born in t to establish a …rm that produces intermediate goods with quality A t+1 in period t + 2, entrepreneurs never establish such …rms. This is because the pro…t of such …rm (6) and therefore its equity market value is always zero.
From (1), investment in fast technology adoption is optimal if
where P t+1 (j) is the price of the share of …rm j is period t + 1.
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As the main goal of this paper is to illustrate the importance of information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors, the basic model assumes that all investors trading in 
Consumers:
Agents (entrepreneurs and investors) born in t consume and retire.
Agents born in t+1 consume and retire.
Agents born in t-1 consume and retire.
Uncertainty about resolves
Investors obtain a noisy signal about entrepreneurs' decision in t.
Entrepreneurs born in t decide to invest I t to establish a firm.
The firm sold in equity market to investors born in t+1.
and know
Figure 2: Timeline of events period t + 1 are uninformed 12 and obtain a noisy signal,~ t+2 , about the explainable part of productivity ( t+2 ). They also observe the technology adoption decisions made one period earlier,1 t (j). The information set of uninformed investors is U t+1 = f~ t+2 ;1 t (j); j 2 [0; 1]g. While entrepreneurs born in t know t+2 , they do not know~ t+2 . Figure 2 summarizes the main mechanism and timing of the events.
Markets
The …nal goods are used in the local market for aggregate consumption (C t ), investments in intermediate goods production ( R 1 0 x t (j)dj) and investments in technology ( R 1 01 t (j)I t (j)dj). These expenditures must equal aggregate production Y t and the net in ‡ow of goods from abroad (F t ). The local goods market clearing condition is
The …nal good production sector employs the entire local labor force. Hence, the labor market clearing condition is L = :
The supply in equity market in period t consists of the shares of local monopolistic …rms that invested in fast technology adoption in period t 1. Local and foreign consumers born in period t hold these shares.
Identical pro…ts and technology adoption decisions
If entrepreneurs invest in fast technology adoption in period t,1 t (j) = 1, the optimal solution for the …nal goods sector (2) and intermediate goods sector (6) implies that the demand for an intermediate good is linear in labor productivity and quality of technology,
and the equilibrium pro…t in any sector j is
Because pro…ts are the same across …rms, all entrepreneurs make identical choices, i.e.
1 t (j) =1 t for any j. As a result, there is a continuum of monopolistic …rms whose pro…ts are perfectly correlated. If1 t = 1, all these …rms are traded in the equity market and modeling all these …rms and their owners is equivalent to modeling one risky asset and one entrepreneur. Therefore P t+1 (j) = P t+1 . If1 t = 0, the supply of equity in period t + 1 is zero and consumers invest all their wage income (or wealth) in risk-free asset.
Equity prices 2.3.1 General results
The optimal technology adoption decision in period t can be solved backwards by …rst …nding the equilibrium equity price in t + 1 and then substituting it in the optimality condition for fast technology adoption (see equation (10)).
The basic model assumes that all investors (local and foreign) trading in the equity market are identical. Maximizing utility (1) subject to the individual investor's budget constraint c t+2 = [ t+2 P t+1 ]ĥ t +Ŵ t+1 ;Ŵ t+1 2 fW ; w t+1 g yields the optimal equity demandĥ t aŝ
where U t+1 denotes the information set available to investors in trading period t + 1. Using the worldwide equity market clearing condition, ĥ t + (^ )ĥ t =^ ĥ t = 1, the equilibrium equity price becomes
If the equity market is perfect, de…ned as no asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and investors (i.e. investors know t+2 ) and a liquid market (i.e.^ ! 1), it is clear from (13) and (15) that the equilibrium equity price is
Equity prices in liquid market
Given that this paper analyzes a small open economy, it is reasonable to assume that the number of uninformed foreign investors who can invest in the local equity is large as compared to the size of the local market. Therefore, assume a liquid market, where^ ! 1. Using then (13), (15) and E u t+2 j U t+1 = 0, the equilibrium equity price is:
When the number of uninformed investors approaches in…nity, the amount of equity each of them holds approaches zero. This forces the equilibrium risk premium, ^ Var t+2 j U t+1
to zero and the equity price corresponds to conditional expectations of uninformed investors.
Investors obtain a noisy public signal~ t+2 = t+2 + t+2 , where t+2 is uniformly distributed in the interval
and is a measure of the quality of information that investors have. They also know entrepreneurs'technology adoption decision. Given that entrepreneurs have superior information (i.e. they know t+2 ), we can conjecture that their decision to invest in fast technology adoption,1 t = 1, implies that t+2 t+2 . This conjecture is veri…ed in Section 2.4 where it is also shown that the threshold ( t+2 ) is known to uninformed investors trading in t + 1. Hence investors information set U t+1 = f~ t+2 ; t+2 t+2 g The technology adoption decision reveals information about t+2 whenever~ t+2 t+2
1 . In such case t+2 j1 t = 1 is uniformly distributed in the interval h 1 ;~ t+2 t+2 i and expected productivity (and pro…t) is higher compared to the case where technology adoption decision is not informative (~ t+2 t+2 > 1 ), i.e.
The condition~ t+2 t+2 1 can be written as t+2 $ t+2 1 t+2 t+2 and equilibrium equity price is:
Equity prices can deviate from the perfect equity market benchmark (16) for two reasons. First, the public signal investors receive can be incorrect, i.e. t+2 6 = 0. Second, when investment in technology is informative ( t+2 $ t+2 ), entrepreneur's decision to invest in fast technology adoption increases the market value of his …rm as it implies that the explainable part of productivity t+2 is not too low. The main results in this paper arise from these too e¤ects.
As a …nal note, the technology adoption choice is potentially uninformative in this setting only because of the distributional assumptions about the public signals. As the upper bound of the support of the uniform distribution is …nite, investors who receive a very high public signal (~ t+2 ) know with certainty that entrepreneurs would have invested in the technology even if t+2 is at its lowest possible value. If such case is very unlikely, as in the case of normal distribution analyzed in Section 3.2, the technology adoption decision is always informative.
Technology adoption decision
Entrepreneurs'technology adoption decision in period t is based on their knowledge of the explainable part of productivity, t+2 . There is uncertainty about the asset price in period t + 1, because entrepreneurs do not know~ t+2 (and t+2 ).
Given (10) and results in Section 2.2, investment in technology pays o¤ if
Proposition 1 Entrepreneurs choose to adopt technology fast (A t+2 = A t+2 ) if the observable component of productivity satis…es t+2 t+2 , where
Proof. Let us evaluate (20) it in the neighborhood of the threshold, i.e. t+2 = t+2 + t+2 , where t+2 ! 0 13 . In such case, fast technology adoption decision is always 13 The proof for the general case
14 Replacing these in (20) and rearranging proves the proposition.
It can be seen from above that the threshold depends on the variables and constants that are observable by all agents. Therefore, investors trading in period t + 1 know the value of t+2 . Proposition 1 thereby veri…es the conjecture in Section 2.3.2.
Corollary 1.1 In perfect equity market, the threshold simpli…es to
Proof. Using (16) in (20) gives (22). An alternative way to prove it uses the fact that in perfect equity market ! 1. Using (21) lim !1 t+2 = . As long as information in equity market is not perfect, there are two opposite forces that a¤ect the adoption decision: "fear of unstable markets" and "adoption to signal".
The "fear of unstable markets" force is captured by the term
in (21). Uncertainty about the price on exit has a negative e¤ect on risk averse agents' incentives to invest in the frontier technology. This force arises from the possibility that the equity price deviates from the perfect equity market benchmark due to an error in the public signal (i.e. the …rst e¤ect discussed at the end of Section 2.3.2). This force is strongest in underdeveloped equity markets, where quality of information ( ) is low. The magnitude of this force monotonically decreases with improvements in the quality of information (i.e. @ A t+2 24 2 .
@ < 0). The "adoption to signal" term is captured by 1 2 in (21). Entrepreneurs know that uninformed investors will take fast adoption as an indication of higher pro…tability and are willing to pay a higher price for it (19). Therefore, technology investment decision becomes a natural signal that increases entrepreneurs'incentives to invest in fast technology adoption (i.e. the second e¤ect discussed at the end of Section 2.3.2). The possibility of gains from this remains despite the fact that uninformed investors are rational and aware of the force. This force is also strongest in underdeveloped equity markets, because the informativeness of the technology adoption decision in such markets is higher. It decreases with improvements in the quality of information (i.e. @ 1 2 . @ < 0).
14 More speci…cally, let us call
) and p Pr ( t+2 > $ t+2 ). Then using (19), the law of total expectations implies
Corollary 1.2 The probability of fast technology adoption is higher than in perfect equity market, if quality of information is above a …nite threshold
Proof. For any prior distribution of t+2 , probability of fast technology adoption is higher than in perfect equity market i¤ t+2 P t+2 . Using (21) and (22) 2 . Simplifying this proves the corollary. Corollary 1.2 has some interesting implications. While both forces decrease with the development of the equity market (increase of ), the "fear of unstable markets" tends to be relatively stronger compared to the "adoption to signal" force when the quality of information is low. Therefore, the model suggests that countries with underdeveloped equity markets are more likely to adopt technology slowly.
"Adoption to signal" force is relatively stronger, when quality of information is high. However, as the magnitude of both forces decreases with the quality of information, fast technology adoption is most likely when the quality of information is at an intermediate level. If the quality of information is very high, the potential gains are negligible.
To formalize the argument, suppose that a local policy maker's objective is to maximize the probability of the fast technology adoption. As it will be shown in Section 2.5, such objective also maximizes output and wages in period t + 2 and therefore increases the consumption of local agents bene…ting from this. Maximizing the probability of fast technology adoption is equivalent to minimizing the threshold for fast technology adoption, i.e. opt = arg min t+2 ;
where t+2 is given by (21).
Corollary 1.3 If a policy maker has full control over the quality of information, he will set the quality of information at
Proof. The proof is straightforward from (24). This corollary suggests that the local policy maker does not choose full transparency ( opt ! 1). This is due to the "adoption to signal" force that enables fast technology adoption at a lower level of productivity than what would be possible in perfect equity market. It is important to point out that the seemingly suboptimal policy encouraging potentially "too fast" technology adoption is justi…ed because the policy maker is local. Only local agents that lose from "too fast" technology adoption are local investors. As local investors hold only a negligible share of local equity (namely they hold ĥ 0, given that is …nite, (13), (14) and (17), the additional opportunities of fast technology come at the expense of losses of foreign investors.
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Figure 3 summarizes the main …ndings in this section. The further implications of Corollary 1.2 and 1.3 are the following. High risk aversion ( ) magni…es the "fear of unstable markets" force and therefore increases the minimum quality of information that guarantees that the "adoption to signal" force dominates the "fear of unstable markets" force. It also makes the optimal quality of information higher.
It is clear from (22) that if productivity were to remain constant at some ^ , a country can always keep up with fast technology adoption under perfect equity market. In imperfect equity markets, the impact of "fear of unstable markets" will increase with the level of technology, A t+2 (see equation (23)). This is because pro…ts (13) and variance of pro…ts are higher at higher technology levels. This implies, that there is a tendency towards persistently slow technology adoption over time, i.e. failing to adopt fast in one period makes it less likely to adopt fast in the following periods. To o¤set such tendency, policy makers would aim for higher transparency over time as it can be seen from (25).
If, in addition, we assume that the cost of fast technology adoption is an increasing function of the distance to the frontier as in Aghion et al. (2006) 
, makes the tendency towards persistently slow technology adoption stronger. It is clear from (21) that failing to adopt technology fast once will also make it more costly to adopt fast in the following period.
Proposition 1 also implies that participation of foreign investors, who might be able to adopt frontier technology for a lower cost, i.e.
< , would increase the probability of fast technology adoption in a discrete manner. However, they would be a¤ected by the same forces. Therefore, foreign venture capitalists or other foreign agents would not participate in technology adoption in countries where quality of information is low (underdeveloped equity markets). The model suggests that this outcome does not require these countries to have unskilled labor force or any other institutional frictions that reduce the productivity, t .
Aggregate output, wages and local goods market clearing
The demand for intermediate goods in the case of fast technology adoption is given by (12). If technology is adopted slowly, the optimization problems of …nal good sector (2) and intermediate goods sector (6) implies
Replacing the labor market clearing condition, = L, and demand for intermediate capital goods, (12) and (26) in the production function (3), the aggregate …nal good production is increasing in the level of technology and the productivity of the labor force:
From the …rst order condition of (2), the equilibrium wages are proportional to aggregate …nal good production:
Under the assumption about the growth rate (8), output (and wages) are always higher when technology is adopted fast (i.e.1 t = 1). A violation of (8) would mean that there is no demand from the …nal good sector for intermediate goods with quality A t in period t.
To illustrate the e¤ect of technology choices on growth rate, assume for a moment that the realized productivity stays constant t = . If technology is always adopted either slowly or fast, the growth rate of output (g y;t = Y t =Y t 1 1) equals to the growth rate of technology g y;t = g . Condition (8) also implies that if technology is adopted fast in period t and slowly in period t + 1, the growth rate is lower, i.e. g y;t = 1 1 < g . If technology is adopted slowly in period t and fast in period t + 1, the growth rate is higher, i.e. g y;t = 1 (1 + g ) (1 + g ) 1 > g . There is growth in the case of a switch from fast to slow technology adoption because of the assumption about competition in intermediate goods sector. In such a case, technology adopting …rms lose monopolistic power and the deadweight loss caused by this, disappears in one period.
Finally, Appendix B con…rms that local goods market clears every period, which completes the model.
Extensions
The basic model in Section 2 emphasized the importance of two main forces, "fear of unstable markets" and "adoption to signal", and the implied non-monotonic relationship between the quality of information in equity markets and technology investments (and output). This section demonstrates that these …ndings are robust, when considering a less restrictive framework, where the equity market is not perfectly liquid (Section 3.1), or some investors are as well informed as entrepreneurs (Section 3.2). The basic model also assumed that there is only one talented entrepreneur in each sector. It will be shown that free entry and competition for better quality of technology among entrepreneurs, reinforces the aggregate e¤ect of the main forces (Section 3.3).
Illiquid equity market
While the assumption that the number of potential investors is large is reasonable for small open economies that have functioning local equity markets, it may not be realistic in all cases. For example, countries may use restrictions on foreign portfolio investments, or the trading costs may be high, or the local equity market may be too underdeveloped to attract enough foreign investors. In such cases, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that equity markets are not liquid (i.e. the number of investors^ is …nite). The negative e¤ect of lack of liquidity in the equity market has been identi…ed by Bencivenga et al. (1995) and Levine (1991) , who do not explicitly model the equity market. By explicitly modelling the equity market, this e¤ect can be isolated from the e¤ects that arise from information asymmetry between investors and entrepreneurs.
As in Section 2.3.2., information set of investors is U t+1 = f~ t+2 ; t+2 t+2 g. From (15), the equity price is a¤ected by the risk premium ^ Var [ t+2 j t+1 ]. As pro…t (13) depends on the unexplainable component of productivity, u t+2 , the variance of pro…ts depends on the variance of u t+2 . Assume that u t+2 u
. Using this, (13), (15),~ t+2 = t+2 + t+2
and $ t+2 = 1 t+2 t+2 , the equilibrium equity price is
In addition to the two main e¤ects (discussed in Section 2.3.2), that make equity prices to deviate from the perfect equity market benchmark (16), lack of liquidity tends to reduce equity prices because of the risk premium. If technology adoption decision is informative, there is a secondary e¤ect in play: an error in public signal ( t+2 ) moves the expected value and variance of pro…ts in the same direction. From the point of view of an entrepreneur, this e¤ect tends to reduce the variance of equity prices.
Proposition 2 In an illiquid equity market entrepreneurs choose to adopt technology fast (A t+2 = A t+2 ) if the observable component of productivity satis…es t+2 ^ t+2 , where
where (^ ; ) 1
. 16 Replacing these in (20) and rearranging proves the proposition.
In an illiquid market three forces a¤ect the incentives to invest in fast technology adoption. First, the "adoption to signal" force ( ) in an illiquid market is exactly the same as in the liquid market (21). As before, the opportunity to increase …rm's market value, increases entrepreneur's incentives to invest.
Second, the discouraging "fear of unstable markets" force ( 2 ) depending on the values of^ and . On the one hand, there is an additional source of uncertainty, which arises from the uncertainty about the risk premium ( ^ Var [ t+2 j t+1 ]). This tends to increase the magnitude of "fear on unstable markets". On the other hand, the positive correlation between the expected value and variance of pro…ts, discussed above, reduces the variance of prices. We can see from 16 See footnote 14. Calculating the variance uses the following relationship for any random variable x and constants a, b, c: V ar(ax + bx
. Notice also that E " the de…nition of (^ ; ) that the "fear of unstable markets" force tends to be stronger in illiquid market, if the market is highly illiquid (i.e.^ is low) 17 .
Third, there is a new force that can be called the "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect captured by the term
. Lack of liquidity has a negative e¤ect on equity prices through the risk premium. The "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect is monotonically decreasing in the number of investors (^ ) and the quality of information investors have ( ). It is also the only force that is increasing in uncertainty about the unexplainable component of productivity (1= u ). Other forces are not a¤ected by u , because investors and entrepreneurs have exactly the same information about this component.
Without loss of generality, assume that 
It is higher than the threshold in perfect equity market (22) because of the negative e¤ect of the risk premium on equity prices. Proof. See Appendix C. Corollary 2.1 con…rms that the non-monotonic relationship between the probability of fast technology adoption and quality of information in equity market is robust to the lack of liquidity. If = 0, the threshold in the case of no information asymmetry (31) is the same as in perfect equity market (22). Therefore, technology adoption is more likely in imperfectly informed and illiquid market than in perfect market whenever > ^ . In such case, the 17 (^ ; ) > 1 if and only if^ < positive "adoption to signal" force is stronger than both the "fear of unstable markets" force and the "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect together.
It can be seen from (31) that an increase of reduces the the probability of fast technology adoption. If is small, "adoption to signal" force is stronger than the negative forces for some range of in the interval ( ^ ; 1). If is large, "adoption to signal" never dominates both the "fear of unstable markets" force and the "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect. Under the assumption that the variance of the unexplainable component of productivity is not too low compared to the explainable one, is a su¢ cient but not a necessary condition for technology adoption in illiquid market to be less likely than in perfect market ( ^ > ). This holds for a wider range of parameters and . It does not hold for all values of these parameters and^ because of the presence of (^ ; ) in (30). The ambiguity arises from the secondary e¤ect through which the lack of liquidity can reduce the variance of prices (as discussed above, this is more likely if^ is relatively high). This section highlights the need to separate the e¤ect of di¤erent improvements in equity market. In less developed equity markets, where both quality of information and liquidity are likely to be low, improvements in either of them increases the probability of fast technology adoption. In more developed equity markets, where both quality of information and liquidity are likely to be relatively high, only further improvements in liquidity increase the probability of fast technology adoption.
Informed investors
The main model in Section 2 assumes that only entrepreneurs can be informed. In a more realistic setting, some investors are likely to be able and willing to acquire the same information. For example, local (institutional) investors or generally more sophisticated investors may face lower information costs compared to the average equity market participant. This section shows that the …ndings are robust to the presence of such investors.
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Assume that there are^ I informed investors trading in period t + 1 equity market. The information set that is relevant for these investors is
The remaining^
U =^ ^ I investors are uninformed. These investors obtain a noisy signal,~ t+2 = t+2 + t+2 , where t+2 N 0; 1 . This is similar to Section 2 apart from the assumption that the public signal is now normally distributed. This allows to derive the equilibrium equity price analytically, which would not be possible when maintaining the assumption about uniform distribution. It will be shown shortly, that the distributional assumptions do not alter the main …ndings. The existence of some informed investors in the equity market implies that uninformed investors obtain information about the productivity, t+2 , also from the equity price, P t+1 . In order to prevent the equity price from being fully revealing (the Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) paradox ), assume that in addition to the rational informed and uninformed investors, there are some noise traders who demand a random quantity s t+1 N (0; 1= 2 A 2 t+2 s ) of equity. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that noise traders do not receive wage income and do not have initial wealth 20 .The assumption that the variance of noise trading decreases with the quality of technology guarantees that the variance of the price signals uninformed investors receive does not increase over time 21 .
As in Section 2, it can be guessed and veri…ed that1 t = 1 implies that t+2 t+2 . Therefore, the information set uninformed investors have is U t+1 = f~ t+2 ; P t+1 ; t+2 t+2 g. Finally, assume that the unexplainable part of productivity u t+2 N 0; 1 u and the variables t+2 , t+2 , s t+1 and u t+2 are uncorrelated with each other and over time. 19 The …ndings are also robust to endogenizing the number of informed investors. This extension is available at author's website. 20 Given the CARA utility assumed, the split of wage income between noise traders and rational agents does not a¤ect aggregate conditions and conclusions in the model. 21 Relaxing this assumption would tend to increase the tendency towards slow technology adoption over time discussed in Section 2.4. In such case, the quality of information uninformed investors have, would become worse over time and magnify the "fear of unstable markets" force.
The equilibrium equity price is derived in Appendix D. Focusing on the case where equity market is liquid in the sense that the number of uninformed investors is large, i.e. U t ! 1, it is shown that equity price equals to the expected pro…t by uninformed investors P t+1 = E t+2 j U t+1 and is given by
where is the inverse Mills ratio that is always positive.
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Comparing (32) with (19) shows similar e¤ects to the ones discussed in Section 2.3.2. Equity prices can di¤er from those in perfect equity market (16) for two reasons. First, there can be errors in the signals investors receive ( t+2 6 = 0 and/ors t+1 6 = 0). The individual e¤ect of these shocks depends on the relative precision of public and price signal. Second, entrepreneur's decision to invest in fast technology adoption increases the market value of the …rm. This is re ‡ected in the presence of b t+1 > 0 in (32).
Proposition 3 Entrepreneurs choose to adopt technology fast if the observable component of productivity satis…es t+2 t+2
where 1 ; 2 > 0, 2 < 1. The probability of fast technology adoption is higher than in perfect equity market if the quality of information is above a …nite threshold
Proof. See Appendix E. Comparing Proposition 3 with Proposition 1 and Corollary 1.2 shows that all mechanisms discussed in Section 2 are robust to the inclusion of a limited number of informed investors. As before, there is the encouraging "adoption to signal" force captured by the term 1 p zv and the discouraging "fear of unstable markets" force captured by the term
. Fast technology adoption is more likely than in perfect equity market, if the average quality of information (z v ) is not too low. The quality of information high when either the number of informed investors ( I ) is high or uninformed investors receive relatively precise public signals (i.e. is high). There are a few additional implications. The variance of unexplainable component of productivity (1= u ) does not a¤ect the probability of fast technology adoption if there are no informed investors (^ I ! 0). However, with some informed investors, the higher variance of this component reduces the probability of fast technology adoption. This is because informed investors hold less equity, which reduces the informativeness of price signals and the overall quality of information in equity market (z v ). There is an additional channel through which higher risk aversion ( ) reduces the probability of fast technology adoption. First, as before the magnitude of the "fear of unstable markets" force is higher, because entrepreneurs care more about the uncertainty (the right hand side of (35) increases). Second, the average quality of information in equity market is lower, because informed investors hold less equity and price signals reveal less information (using (33), the left hand side of (35) decreases).
Endogenous entry to entrepreneurship
So far, the paper assumed that there is only one talented local entrepreneur in each sector of the economy, who has skills to adopt technology fast. In a more realistic environment, good prospects for technological improvements are likely to encourage entry of several …rms that compete for being the best innovator. An illustrative example of this is the information technologies sector in the 1990s, when good prospects of developing new technologies lead to high entry rates of new …rms. Many of these …rms, were unsuccessful. This section considers the implications of free entry to entrepreneurship and competition for the best technology. Assume that potential entrepreneurs di¤er in the quality of technology they can adopt. For example, they can di¤er in their innovative skills, or in the case of pure adoption of the existing frontier technology, they can adopt it with some loss (or improvement) in quality. Assume that the technology that can be adopted by an entrepreneur k is 
: They also know the total number of entrants, N . After paying the entry cost, entrepreneurs …nd out t+2 and become able to adopt technology.
Assume further that
. If this assumption would not hold, it would be always or never optimal to invest in fast technology adoption and the problem would be uninteresting.
In t t, an entrepreneur k decides whether to invest an additional # 0 25 in order to …nd out k t and apply for a patent that gives him monopolistic rights to produce intermediate goods with quality A k t+2 in period t + 2. At this stage, he knows t+2 . Assume that only the best technology gets a patent by period t. Therefore, among all entrepreneurs that apply for a patent, indexed with n 2 f1; ::; N g, an entrepreneur k will become the monopolist, only if A k t+2 = maxfA 1 t+2 ; :::; A N t+2 g. In period t, there is one entrepreneur, who has obtained the patent and knows the quality of his technology A k t+2 . This entrepreneur decides whether to invest A k t+2 in developing the technology or to quit. This stage is equivalent to the technology investment decision in the previous sections of the paper. Figure 5 summarizes the timing.
This game can be solved backwards. In period t, the bene…t of technology adoption for the entrepreneur who survives is
in all settings analyzed. 26 Given this, we can derive the optimal decisions in earlier periods and the equilibrium number of entrants.
Proposition 4 The equilibrium number of entrants N is decreasing in t+2 , and increasing inD t+2 ,ĝ, . If fast technology adoption is optimal ( t+2 > t+2 ), the expected growth rate of technology is E A t+2 jN ; t+2 t+2
Proof. See Appendix F. Proposition 4 implies that a decrease of the threshold for fast technology adoption ( t+2 ) leads to a higher number of entrants. A decrease in t+2 increases the probability of fast technology adoption and the expected gains from technology investments. Given the results of the previous sections, the number of entrants is higher than in perfect equity market if and only if the "adoption to signal" force is stronger than the "fear of unstable markets" force (and the "direct lack of liquidity" e¤ect, if the equity market is not liquid).
Proposition 4 also implies that the higher is the equilibrium number of entrants, the faster is the expected growth rate of technology,
. This is because higher competition among entrants increases the expected quality of technology of the …rm that survives and aggregate output.
Combining Proposition 4 with the …ndings in Section 2.4, 3.1 and 3.2, it is clear that the technology tends to develop faster than in perfect equity market if the "adoption to signal" force dominates the other forces. Similarly, it would develop more slowly, if the discouraging "fear of unstable market" (and "direct lack of liquidity") force dominates. Therefore, when there is free entry to entrepreneurship, the aggregate impact of the main forces discussed in this paper is ampli…ed.
The other variables that lead to higher entry and growth are higher opportunities for technological improvement (ĝ and ) and optimism among entrepreneurs (highD t+2 ). The e¤ect of optimism on growth would be absent if # > 0; provided that the signal potential entrepreneurs receive remains private. 26 Assume that a …rm with technology A k t+2 survives. Then (20) implies that the bene…t from developing a better technology is U
. Using E [P t+1 j t+2 ], Var(P t+1 j t+2 ) from the proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 and from Appendix E and the thresholds (21), (30) and (34) gives (37). Notice that this holds when the di¤erence t+2 t+2 is relatively small.
Empirical implications
This section highlights the testable empirical implications of the model and discusses suggestive evidence from the existing empirical literature. The main novel implications of the model are the "adoption to signal" force and the non-monotonic relationship between information in the equity market and output (or investments in technology)
"Adoption to signal" force This force suggests that investors take investments in technology and pre-announcements of new products (i.e. announcements of a new product that are being developed, but not yet marketed) as a positive signal about the future value of the …rm. This alone does not prove the presence of "adoption to signal" force, as investors may price such announcements correctly. However, in more developed equity markets (i.e. is high), where "adoption to signal" is likely to dominate the negative forces, the model predicts overinvestment in technology (compared to fundamental value) that is positively associated with overpricing of equity and subsequent lower returns from the equity market.
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Within this spirit, a good example of the "adoption to signal" force is the development of Windows Vista, that lead to temporary overpricing of Microsoft:
"Microsoft had 25 percent gain in its stock price in the six months before launching its Vista operating system. But after Vista became available to consumers in January -and got lukewarm response -the stock wilted. /../ The share price then climbed again, but is below its pre-launch peak" (Washington Post 01/07/2007) Microsoft share had a cumulative abnormal return of 14 percent in the 6 months before the worldwide release of Windows Vista on January 30, 2007. In the 6 months after the release, the cumulative abnormal return was -5.8 percent.
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Some more indirect examples of a positive e¤ect of investments in technology and new product pre-announcements on stock prices are the following:
"Stock price boosting succeeds so well because Wall Street is full of investors looking for a lower-priced stock that may develop a new electronics or space product and become a fast 27 Consider a simple example in the framework of Section 2. Assume that the shocks are at their mean value, i.e. t+2 = 0 and u t+2 = 0. From (19) equity is overpriced P t+1 = A t+2 t+2 + 1 2 , from (13) and (19) investors get negative returns t+2 P t+1 = A t+2 1 2 , and from (21), (22) and (23) there is overinvestment in technology if
, where > if "adoption to signal" dominates "fear of unstable markets" force. 28 Author's calculations. The market index used is the S&P Composite Index. The speci…c event of the Vista announcement is hard to identify, because of frequent build releases, rumors, leaks, etc. For example, the release to manufacturing build (the …nal version of the code that is shipped to customers) was …nished on November 1, 2006 and announced by Microsoft on November 8, 2006. Microsoft share had a cumulative abnormal return of 4.9 percent in the 10-day window around November 8. raising glamour stock. The spread of stock-option plans as a form of executive compensation has made stock minded men of many corporate bosses who once paid little attention to Wall Street" (TIME U.S. 01/02/1961) "Compaq share price may well reach $120 or so over the next 6 to 12 months [at the time of the article, the share price was $98.25] /../ Analysts point out an expected new-product announcement next week as an example of Compaq's present strength" (The New York Times 14/04/94) "There are two qualities you should always look for: innovation and valuation. It was the relentless focus in the network sector that made Cisco Systems a stock market icon in the late 1990s" (Newsweek 09/04/01)
The positive e¤ect of new product pre-announcements on stock prices has also been documented in an empirical study by Mishra and Bhabra (2001) . In particular, they show that pre-announcements have a positive impact on stock prices if they are accompanied with some evidence such as investments, R&D e¤orts, prototype or product demonstrations etc. Pre-announcements that lack such evidence, do not a¤ect equity prices. This indicates that a commitment to develop a new product is taken as a positive signal by investors.
The "adoption to signal" force implies that the equity prices do not just increase, but equity is likely to be overpriced because of investments in technology. There is overwhelming empirical evidence of positive relationship between overpriced equity and investments 29 .
However, an alternative reason for this could be that credit constrained and equity dependent …rms issue more equity to …nance their investments (e.g. Baker, Stein and Wurgler 2003) .
To test "adoption to signal" force, this channel should be controlled for. A recent paper by Polk and Sapienza (2008) presents systematic evidence that is consistent with the "adoption to signal" force. They explicitly control for equity issuance channel and …nd that …rms with abnormal investments are overpriced and subsequently have low stock returns. They …nd that this pattern is particularly strong for R&D intensive …rms. It is also stronger for …rms with shorter shareholder horizons. The "adoption to signal" force provides a rational explanation for this pattern. Polk and Sapienza (2008) explain the pattern through a more behavioral argument. Namely, they argue that investors irrationally pay higher price for …rms that make particular investments (i.e. investments in technology and R&D). Entrepreneurs, knowing this, will cater the market sentiment and choose to overinvest in such projects. The "adoption to signal" force provides a direct explanation why investors take an investment in technology as a positive signal and why they systematically pay too much for …rms that overinvest in technology. These investments reveal noisy information about high future productivity. While investors know that the resulting increase of the market value gives some entrepreneurs an incentive to overinvest, they do not know whether a particular entrepreneur invested because of this or because of high future productivity.
The catering theory also relies on a stronger assumption than the one adopted in this paper. Namely, entrepreneurs should have superior information about both the value of their …rm and the future sentiment in equity market, as opposed to only about the value of their …rm, as it is assumed in the current paper.
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Non-monotonic relationship between equity market development and output
The model predicts a non-monotonic (concave) relationship between the level of equity market development and investments in technology (or output). In particular, at the low level of equity market development, an improvement either in the quality of information (increase of ) or in the liquidity of the equity market (increase of^ ) increases investments in technology and growth. Conversely, if the information asymmetry is small, only improvements in liquidity are likely to increase investments in technology, while improvements in quality of information would reduce it.
As mentioned in the Introduction and shown in Appendix A, cross country correlations between a measure of equity market development and R&D investment is consistent with a potentially non-monotonic relationship. Furthermore, a recent paper by Rousseau and Wachtel (2005) shows that the relationship between broad measures of …nancial development and growth that was robust in the sample 1960-1989 is absent in the more recent 1990-2003 sample. In particular, the relationship is missing among the more developed countries, where the quality of information is likely to be higher in absolute terms and improved in the more recent years. However, the positive relationship is still present within poorer countries. As higher incentives to invest also imply higher demand for credit, this is an indirect indication for a potentially non-monotonic relationship.
A rigorous empirical test of the model should take into account the channels through which credit and equity markets provide funding for R&D investments, which the current paper abstracts from. The evidence suggests that retained earnings and debt are more important sources for …nancing corporate investments than equity issuance (see e.g. Rajan and Zingales 1995, Mayer and Sussman 2004) . Furthermore, using macro data, papers by Levine and Zervos (1998) , Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) and Beck and Levine (2004) …nd that stock market development is positively correlated with growth when controlling for access to credit.
While the existing literature that seeks for a monotonic relationship between equity market development and output makes a compelling case for the existence of the negative "fear of unstable markets" and "direct lack of liquidity" forces, it does not allow for a nonmonotonic relationship. To the extent that broad measures of equity market development (e.g. market capitalization, value traded) are likely to be correlated with both, the quality of information and the number of potential investors, further empirical analysis should consider the possibility of a non-monotonicity.
A more direct test of the predictions of the model could aim to separate the negative lack of liquidity e¤ect from the non-monotonic quality of information e¤ect. This may be complicated because it requires good measures of both. In reality, the liquidity may be low precisely because the quality of information is low. It is also likely that the sample of countries (or …rms), where there is "too little" information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors is very small or non-existing. The information asymmetry is likely to be present even in countries with well functioning equity markets, such as the United States.
Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of information imperfections in equity market on entrepreneurs'incentives to invest in technology and the resulting di¤erences in the speed of technology adoption across countries. It argues that if …rms that engage in technology adoption are sold in imperfectly informed equity markets, two main opposite forces arise: a negative "fear of unstable markets" force and a positive "adoption to signal" force.
The relative importance of these forces depends on the quality of information in equity markets. "Adoption to signal" is likely to be most in ‡uential in countries where equity markets are developed but not perfect, while "fear of unstable markets" should dominate in underdeveloped markets. The less precise are the signals on which uninformed traders base their decisions, the stronger are these forces. The importance of both forces falls with improvements in the quality of information. Still, the recent overpricing of the technology sector assets in the United States and other developed countries suggests that there is room for "adoption to signal" (which in this case it should be seen as "innovation to signal") even in developed countries.
The mechanisms analyzed in this paper a¤ect both local entrepreneurs and foreign investors (such as venture capitalists) intending to invest in establishing new …rms. Uncertainty about equity prices in markets where quality of information is low, can discourage foreign investors from participating in projects where they could reduce the costs associated with adopting the frontier technology. The limited presence of venture capitalists in most developing countries is likely to re ‡ect the weakness and instability of local equity markets.
The paper also shows that the main forces are robust to a number of extensions. If equity markets are illiquid, it creates an additional negative e¤ect that reduces the incentives to invest in fast technology adoption. The relationship between the degree of information asymmetry and the probability of fast technology adoption remains nevertheless non-monotonic. The setup is also robust to the inclusion of some informed investors in equity market.
The main forces are magni…ed, when there is free entry to entrepreneurship. If the "adoption to signal" force is strong enough to dominate the other forces, both the number of …rms that enter and the growth rate of economy is higher compared to the perfect equity markets. The opposite is true, if the "fear of unstable markets" and/or the "direct lack of liquidity" force is strong.
The paper also shows that a local policy maker would not aim for a full transparency (i.e. eliminating the information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and equity market participants) in order to maximize the chances of fast technology adoption. This is due to the "adoption to signal force" that has its strongest e¤ect at an intermediate level of quality of information. The bene…ts of "too fast" technology adoption are present because it is likely to be largely …nanced by foreign investors. Furthermore, due to monopolistic distortions, the social bene…ts of better technology (though generating higher output and wages) are higher than private bene…ts (to the owners of the …rms). Therefore, encouraging fast technology adoption is likely to be bene…cial even in a closed economy.
The paper assumes that the …rms are listed in the local stock exchange. Listing in a well established stock exchange (e.g. NASDAQ) can allow a …rm to access a larger number of potential buyers. For the mechanisms analyzed in this paper to be valid, this assumption is not crucial, because the uncertainty is about the local economy. Listing in a foreign stock exchange is more likely to increase liquidity than eliminate information asymmetry, which is the driver of main results in this paper. Interpreting the equity market to be local is more natural, because for most …rms from developing countries, the …xed costs associated with an initial public o¤ering in NASDAQ are likely to be too high. Therefore, this possibility is only available for the most successful and innovative …rms.
Furthermore, local …rms could be sold directly to a strategic (foreign) owner. As long as the price the strategic owner pays for a …rm re ‡ects its market value, the mechanism suggested in this paper remains valid. If the local equity market is very underdeveloped and most …rms are directly transferred between local agents, potentially both the low number of informed buyers and the lack of liquidity are likely to discourage fast technology adoption. 
B Local goods market clearing
The consumption of each local agent from trading in the asset market is c t =1 t 2ĥt 1 t + m t 1 , where m t 1 is his risk-free asset holdings. De…ning the aggregate equity demand by foreign agents as H t 1 t 1 (^ )ĥ t and using equity market clearing condition1 t 1^ ĥ t = 1 t 1 , the aggregate equity demand by local agents is1 t 1 ĥ t =1 t 1 (1 H t ). De…ning aggregate risk-free asset holdings by local agents as M t m t , their aggregate consumption 31 The …gures about transition countries exclude 5 transition countries that had a substantially lower initial PPP adjusted GDP per capita (below 3000 USD) in 1991. The remaining countries have a mean of 6600 USD and a standard deviation of 2000 USD. from investment in equity and risk-free asset is c t =1 t 2 1 H t 1 t + M t 1 . Some local agents are entrepreneurs adopting technology. These agents consume1 t 1 P t , therefore aggregate consumption is C t = c t +1 t 1 P t =1 t 2 1 H t 1 t + M t 1 +1 t 1 P t .
Each young local agent receives wage income w t and the aggregate budget constraint is
The net in ‡ow of goods from abroad is determined by the net in ‡ow of equity and risk-free asset, F t = 1 t 1 H t P t 1 t 1 H t 1 t + (M t 1 M t ). From the above, we can …nd
From (12) and (26), the aggregate investment in intermediate good production (27) , (28), (39) in to goods market clearing condition (11) gives1 t 2 t =1 t 2 1 (
2 ) 1 1 L t A t and holds by (4) and (13).
C Proof of Corollary 2.1
The proof has three parts: 1) the relationship between ^ t+2 and is non-monotonic, 2) for 2 3
, the threshold ^ is unique and 3) for 
From (40), it is clear that LHS > 0, LHS
> 0 and
that is …nite and 1 and it must hold that ^ > 1. This leads to a contradiction.
D Equity market equilibrium in Section 3.2
Within the setting of Section 3.2, equity market clearing condition is:
whereĥ i t+1 is equity demand by an investor of type i 2 fI; U g. Maximizing utility (1) subject to type i investor's budget constraint,ĉ
, yields the optimal equity demand asĥ
The information set that is relevant for informed investors is
1 u and his optimal equity demand isĥ
Uninformed investors obtain a signal~ t+2 = t+2 + t+2 , where t+2 N 0; 1 . They also observe the equilibrium equity price. We can …nd the information revealed by the equity price by replacingĥ I t+1 into the equity market clearing condition (41), which giveŝ . Uninformed investors also get information from knowing entrepreneurs'investment decision, i.e.1 t = 1 implies that t+2 t+2 . Following pp. 899 in Green (2000) for the moments of truncated normal and (13) gives. 
As the number of foreign uninformed investors Using then~ t+2 = t+2 + t+2 andP t+1 = t+2 +s t+1 gives (32).
E Proof of Proposition 3
Technology adoption decision is given by (20) . Finding the moments E [P t+1 j t+2 ] and Var [P t+1 j t+2 ] is complicated by the fact that the equity price (32) includes b t+1 . While b t+1 is an observable constant for investors trading in t + 1, it is not observable in period t. Expressing b t+1 = p z v t+2 t+2 zv t+2 zv zvs t+1 , it is clear that b t+1 has a normal distribution from the point of view of the entrepreneur who knows t+2 , but does not know t+2 ands t+1 . The moments of Mills ratio with normally distributed b t+1 are, to the best of my knowledge, impossible to derive in closed form. However, it can be approximated. Let us focus on t+2 in the neighborhood of t+2 , i.e. t+2 = t+2 + t+2 and t+2 ! 0. In such a case, b t+1 = p z v zv t+2 zv zvs t+1
and it is reasonable to approximate b t+1 around b t+1 = 0, where t+2 ands t+1 are at their mean value. Using the …rst order Taylor approximation,
Let us call 1 b t+1 =0 and 2 0 b t+1 =0 . As Mills ratio is always positive, and increasing function of b t+1 , it holds that 1 ; 2 > 0. Furthermore, left truncation Mills ratio is a convex function that is close to linear if b t+1 > 3. In the linear area the slope is below 1, therefore 2 < 1. In fact, 1 = b t+1 =0 = 
F Proof of Proposition 4
In t t, entrepreneurs know t+2 and do not know their own and other entrepreneurs' quality of technology. Let us assume …rst that t+2 t+2 , so that further investments are optimal. Denote the event that an entrepreneur k will get the patent as 
It is clear that, if t+2 < t+2 , entrepreneurs would not make further investments and E U k t j t+2 < t+2 ; N = 0. Therefore
In period t 2 t, we can de…ne the bene…t of entry as BE(N ) .
@BE(N ) @N
; q = f t+2 ;D t+2 ;ĝ; g:
It is clear that For the second part, we need to …nd the expected quality of technology for the …rm that survives. Assume that the equilibrium number of entrants in N , and …rm indexed with k survives. Then the expected quality of technology E A t+2 jN ; t+2 t+2 = E A t+2 j from (46) gives (38).
